4.10 If the DSB`s recommendation is not followed within the time limit set by the panel and beginning with the date of adoption of the panel or appelle report, the DSB shall authorise the requesting member to take appropriate action (9) unless the DSB mutually agrees to reject the application. 8.2 Notwithstanding the provisions of Parts III and V, the following subsidies are not in dispute: (b) subsidies which, alone or as one of the others, are contingent on the use of domestic goods through imported goods. 7.10 In the event that a disputing party requests arbitration under Article 22(6) of the DSU, the arbitrator shall determine whether the counter-measures are proportionate to the scale and nature of the adverse effects found. (d) the subsidy results in an increase in the subsidizing Member`s global market share in a given primary product or subsidized primary product (17) compared to the average share it had in the previous three-year period, and that increase follows a consistent trend over a subsidy period. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“ÄTMS” or “Agreement”) sets out and extends the subsidies and countervailing elements of Articles VI and XVI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (“GATT 1994”). It provides for disciplines both on the use of trade-distorting subsidies and on the application by some WTO members of countervailing duties to offset the effects of subsidies. This chapter provides a detailed overview of the rights and obligations defined by the NSCM and its interaction with other parts of the WTO Agreement. It will briefly discuss the history of subsidies and countervailing measures since the introduction of GATT in 1947, and then discuss in detail each provision of the ÄTMS. A separate chapter of this book (Chapter 17) examines findings of injury in anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations, which are governed by the CESSM and the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, also known as the Anti-Dumping Agreement or the TLK. (a) subsidies which, in law or in fact (4), are contingent on export performance alone or as one of several other conditions, including the subsidies listed in point 5 of Annex I; This Article shall not apply to subsidies for agricultural products referred to in Article 13 of the Convention on Agriculture.
(c) subsidies to cover the operating losses of an undertaking, with the exception of one-off measures which are not recurrent and which cannot be repeated for that undertaking and which may be granted only to enable long-term solutions to be developed and to avoid acute social problems; Full-text views reflect the number of PDF downloads, PDFs sent to Google Drive, Dropbox, and Kindle, and full-text html views for chapters in this book. 3.1 In addition to the provisions of the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies shall be prohibited within the meaning of Article 1: (b) subsidies intended to cover operating losses in a sector of activity; 9.4 When a matter is referred to the Committee, the Committee shall without delay consider the facts and evidence of the effects referred to in paragraph 1. If the Committee finds that such effects exist, it may recommend to the subsidizing Member that the programme be modified so as to eliminate its effects. The Committee shall submit its conclusions within 120 days of the date on which it is prosecuted in accordance with paragraph 3. If the recommendation is not adopted within six months, the Committee shall authorize the requesting member to take appropriate countermeasures appropriate to the nature and degree of effects observed. . . .